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21 Introduction
Procrastination, particularly in academics, has been the source of several psychological
studies, but few economic ones. Presumably, this dichotomy exists because psychologists
love to explore irrational behavior and economists usually restrict themselves to rational
conduct, and procrastination is perceived to be irrational, that is, not utility maximizing.
However, if not rational,thebehavior is certainly normal: Ellis and Knaus (1977)estimated
that 95% of college students procrastinate. What seems truly irrational is that economists
should ignore such pervasive work-related behavior.
Fischer (1999) approaches leisure time as an exhaustible resource and ﬁnds that the
standard models from natural resource economics explain many facets of academic pro-
crastination. However, in this fully rational model, the implicit rate of time preference
(and/or elasticity of intertemporal substitution) needed to generate serious procrastination
is much larger than is typically assigned to people in standard economic models. Such
seemingly high rates of time preference may be explained within the context of the ratio-
nal model, but the perception that procrastination is problematic cannot be explained with
time-consistent preferences.
Ofcourse, onealwayswishesonehad moretimeorlesswork,so regretaboutnothaving
worked hard enough earlier is not in itself indicative of irrational or problem procrastina-
tion. However, if one looks ahead at the expected path of behavior and wishes it would
be different, a self-control problem does exist. Solomon and Rothblum (1984) found that
abouthalf ofAmericanuniversitystudentssurveyed reportedthat procrastinationwasaper-
sonal problem of “moderate” or more serious proportions. Furthermore, nearly two-thirds
of respondents wanted to decrease their tendency to procrastinate on tasks likewriting term
papers and studying for exams. The prospective nature of these questions is truly revealing
of self-control failures and undesired procrastination, issues which cannot be captured in
the rational model.3
3That people are willing to engage in costly commitment devices (such as Christmas clubs or fat farms)
3This paper explores the impact of dynamically inconsistent preferences for time dis-
counting on the performance and procrastination of a divisible task when expectations are
rational.4 Two types of time-inconsistentdiscounting areexplored: hyperbolicdiscounting,
which applies a higher discount rate to the short term than the long term, and differential
discounting, which applies a higher discount rate to the costs of work (utility from leisure)
than to rewards. Each type generates more procrastination than standard time-consistent
discounting, but they have different implications for policies to induce work, reduce pro-
crastination,andimprovewelfare. Section2discusses theexistingliterature,itslimitations,
and how the “salience costs” it uses to explain procrastination can motivate these types of
discounting preferences. Section 3 presents the basic framework of procrastination as an
exhaustible resource problem. Sections 4 and 5 then apply it to model time allocation with
hyperbolicand differential discounting, respectively. Section 6 compares the effects of dif-
ferent reward schemes under exponential, hyperbolic, and differentialdiscounting. Section
7 concludes.
2 Salience and Time Discounting
Salience costs, as opposed to pure impatience, are frequently advanced as an explanation
for procrastination. For example, opportunity costs of time today may be more salient than
thosetomorrow;that is, today’sopportunitiesareclear whiletomorrow’sarevague, making
the former seem more pressing. Akerlof (1991) offered a salience-cost model to explain
procrastination of a task requiring action at a single point in time. With a salience cost to
acting today, and none attributed to tomorrow, one always wants to postpone action, even
though the stream of beneﬁts is maximized with immediate action.
to overcome apparent self-control failures is frequently cited as evidence for dynamically inconsistent pref-
erences. See Ainslie (1992) and Loewenstein and Elster (1992) for overviews, as well as Laibson (1995),
Schelling (1978, 1984), Thaler (1980), and Thaler and Shefrim (1981).
4Several economists have advanced models of time-inconsistent or changing preferences to examine sav-
ingsbehavior: Strotz(1956),PhelpsandPollak(1968),Pollak(1968),Peleg andYaari(1973),Laitner(1980),
Laibson (1995).
4The Akerlof model combines several important features, each of which can contribute
to procrastination, but not all of which are necessary to explain the behavior in general:
1. a salient present, creating a temporary preference for the short term;
2. salient costs, implying a heightened sensitivity to the work compared to the rewards;
3. imperfect foresight about future behavior; and
4. an indivisible task.
With today’s costs moresalient than tomorrow’s, a one-time, short-termdiscount factor
is effectively applied to all future action; after today, future costs are evaluated with equal
weight (a long-run discount factor of 1). At the same time, only the costs are more salient;
beneﬁts today are weighted equally with beneﬁts tomorrow. Effectively, different discount
factors are being used for the costs and beneﬁts of the action.
Each ofthese typesofdiscounting alonegeneratedynamically inconsistent preferences:
in each case, current costs tomorrow are weighted more heavily than tomorrow’s costs are
today. However, such preferences by themselves are not sufﬁcient to produce indeﬁnite
procrastination of a ﬁxed task: one must have irrational expectations of the future. If a
person realizesshe will want to postponeagain every day, the rational expectations strategy
is to perform the task at once. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) examine the decision to
procrastinate a one-time task with Akerlof-style salience costs, allowing for rewards or
costs to be salient and expectations to be sophisticated (rational) or na¨ ıve.5
Psychologists describing patterns of relative preferences for rewards and delays have
found they indicate highly bowed discount curves, “predict[ing] that there will be some
pairs of alternative rewards such that a larger, later reward is preferred when the choice is
seen from a distance, but the smaller, earlier rewardis preferred as it becomes imminent.”6
Such studies of temporary preferences typically focus on a heightened sensitivity to the
5They show that rational expectations can still allow for some procrastination. In a four-period model, if
thetask isworthperforminginperiod4,and knowingthisthepersoninperiod3 willprocrastinate,theperson
inperiod2may ﬁndwaitingtwomoreperiodsforthereward toocostlyand wanttoperformit. Consequently,
the person in the ﬁrst period will procrastinate, conﬁdent the task will be performed in the next period.
6Lowenstein and Elster, p. 68.
5present.7 However, these observations, cited as evidence for hyperbolic discounting, may
also be generated by differential discounting.
The Akerlof and O’Donogue-Rabin models effectively combine these two types of dis-
counting in the form of a salient present with salient costs. By concentrating on a different
type of task, one which can be dividedand performedover time, thispaper can separate out
the different impacts of a preference for the short term and differential evaluation of costs
and rewards.
3 Model Framework:
Time as an Exhaustible Resource
Consider a type of task which can be divided into many (if not an inﬁnite number of) small
actions tobe completedover time, such as writinga termpaper. Procrastinationof thiskind
of work is not necessarily characterized by missing deadlines or leaving tasks incomplete;
it can exhibit itself in an increasing workload, as more of the task is performed the closer
the deadline. Academic procrastination is a familiar example: assignments may be handed
in on time, yet procrastination is deemed to have occurred since much of the work was
accomplished at the eleventh hour. In psychology as well as in economics, deﬁnitions
of procrastination differ widely; perhaps the one most closely corresponding to mine is
presented by Solomon and Rothblum (1984): “the act of needlessly delaying tasks to the
point of experiencing subjective discomfort.”8 In general, I will consider procrastinationto
be a steep, rather than constant, work path; however, an additional problem of insufﬁcient
total work may also coincide with this behavior in some situations.
The basicproblem isthat posed in Fischer (1999): when theworkrequirementdemands
many units of effort over a ﬁnite amount of time, when will that effort take place? The
question is similar to a resource extraction problem, as leisure time in the interim is an
7See Ainslie (1992), Loewenstein and Elster (1992), and Thaler (1991) for overviews.
8I interpret “needless” to be in terms of feasibility and “subjective discomfort” to be signiﬁcant disutility
of work near the deadline.
6exhaustible resource.
Suppose a person faces a deadline T days from now, at which time she gets reward
F(), a function of total work completed by the deadline. She gets utility u(lt) for l hours
of leisure on any day t; assume u() is strictly increasing and concave. A maximum of
24 hours per day are available to divide between work and leisure;9 work thus equals the
excess of 24 minus hours of leisure: wt =2 4−l t. In addition, she has a maximum daily
leisure “extraction” rate — a “capacity constraint” — of 24 hours.10
Since preferences may change over time, the dynamic problem is best explained by
dividing the representativeworker into “selves” according to time period. Each self at each
point in time chooses how much work to do that day, taking into account the behavior of
her future selves. Thinking of total leisure time as a resource stock, the problem for each
self can be characterized as a question of how much of the resource stock to leave for the
next self.
Let St represent the total stock of available time not yet used in leisure inherited by
self t.L e tRdenote the minimum amount of work that must be completed by the deadline.
The worker starts out with total potential leisure time of S0 =2 4 T−R , and each self
inherits the stock of the preceding self, less the leisure she extracted: St+1 = St − lt. This
construction will facilitate backing out the optimal path and allow for different types of
reward functions. If the reward is a variable function of cumulative work, R =0and ST
will equal the amount of work completed by the deadline. If a ﬁxed reward is offered, R is
the cumulative work requirement and ST =0 .
This basic framework is the same for all types of discounting. Each self maximizes
her stream of utility from leisure and the reward, with respect to the stock of potential
leisure time she leaves her successor, subject to the aforementioned constraints. Although
preferencesmay not bedynamically consistent, procrastination isstill rational in thissense:
9Those of less hardy stock who need a minimum of sleep may feel free to pick a smaller number.
10The capacity constraint occurs when marginal utilityat leisure all day is positive; in a sense, one would
like to take more than 24 hours of leisure in a day but is technologicallyconstrained by the rate of the earth’s
rotation.
7if the worker had it to do all over again, knowing how she behaved all along the way, she
would act the same.
4 Hyperbolic Discounting
The ﬁrst salience story is that opportunities today are more salient than those tomorrow or
any day following. Akerlof’s salience costs were effectively a high one-term discount rate
for leisure, a simple form similar to hyperbolicdiscounting. Hyperbolic discount functions
have high discount rates for small delays and low discount rates for long delays, a di-
chotomy which generates dynamically inconsistent preferences. From a distance, a person
may prefera larger, later reward,but when the timedraws near, thesmaller, moreimminent
reward will be chosen.
Hyperbolic discount functions have been suggested by some studies of human and an-
imal behavior which show that preferences for time discounting are more deeply bowed
than exponential discount functions.11 For example, facing hypothetical tradeoffs of certi-
ﬁed checks, most people would take $100 today over $200 in 2 years, but not $100 in 6
years over $200 in 8 years.12 Exponential discounters should ﬁnd these tradeoffs identical
in relative terms.
Consider asimpliﬁed,“quasi-hyperbolic”discount functionputforthbyLaibson (1995)
tomimichyperbolicdiscounting: fromtheperspectiveoftimet,utilityof currentconsump-
tion is weighted at unity, while utility of consumption at future time t + i is weighted by
the discount factor i. This function has the advantages of tractability and the intuitive
component of combining a short-run () and long-run () discount factor.
The dynamic inconsistencies created by hyperbolic discounting are best explained by
comparing two “selves.”13 Today’s self discounts tomorrow’s utility by , yet he wants
11Ainslie (1992).
12Lowenstein and Elster (1992), p. 69.
13In honor of David Laibson, I will make the hyperbolicdiscounter a “he.”
8tomorrow’s self to discount the following period’s utility by , which tomorrow’s self will
not do when tomorrowbecomestoday. Hence, thedynamicinconsistency (or intertemporal
schizophrenia).
In deciding how much work to do and when to do it, the self at time t would desire the
current and future work path that maximizes total discounted utility,UH():
UH(lt;l t+1;:::;lT−1)=u ( l t)+





where u(lt) isutilityofleisure at timet, F()is therewardfunction,and St is thetotal stock
of available time not yet used in leisure inherited by self t, as presented in the previous
section. Both u() and F() are strictly increasing, concave functions. Furthermore, let us
assume that u0(0) = 1, which will ensure that lt > 0 for t 2 [0;T−1].
The current self wants future selves to behave as if they have standard exponential
discounting. If self t could control not only lt but also lt+1, lt +2 , etc., he would have
u0(lt)=T−tF0() and u0(lt+i)= T − t − i F 0 (  )for all i  1; i.e., after today marginal
utility would rise at the rate of time preference.14
However, the sophisticated self realizes that he cannot achieve this optimum, since fu-
tureselves will not behave as he desires, and hereacts accordingly. He maximizes utility of
currentand futureconsumption, subject totheconstraints that hissuccessors will maximize
their utility. The equilibrium path can thus be found by backwards induction.
Consider simple log utility functions for both leisure and the reward:15 u(l)=ln(l)
and F(ST)=ln(ST).
The last working self (T −1) maximizes current utility from leisure plus the discounted
14These equations must hold with equality only for lt+i 2 (0;24). If the capacity constraint binds (he
would prefer to consume more than 24 hours of leisure in a day but cannot), then u0(24)  T−tF0() and
u0(24)  T−t−iF 0() for i  1. If the “choke price” is reached (he wouldprefer to work more than 24 hours
thatday but cannot), then u0(0)  T−t−iF()and u(0)  T−t−iF() fori  1. However, the assumption
of u0(0) = 1 eliminates this latter possibility.
15The assumption thatthe utilityfrom leisureand thereward have thesame, constant relative risk-aversion
coefﬁcient (in this case 1) is needed for the time path of the marginal propensity to consume leisure out of
the inherited stock of time to be independent of the ﬁnal amount of work. This independence ensures the
equilibriumtime path is unique.




The resultinglT−1 is alinear functionofST−1, withakinkwherethecapacity constraint
binds:16








T−1 denote T − 1’s (constant) marginal propensity to consume leisure out of the
stock of time he inherits, in this case 1=(1 + ). Suppose for now that T − 1 is not
capacity constrained and thus follows this proportional consumption rule. Self T −2 max-
imizes current utility from leisure, plus the discounted utility from T −1’s leisure, plus the
discounted reward, knowing how T − 1 will behave given how much of the current stock






2ln[(1 − T−1)(ST−2 − lT−2)]

: (4)
The interior solution for lT−1 is also a linear function of inherited stock:







This simple rule actually sufﬁces even if self T − 1 does not face an interior solution,
because if T − 1 is capacity constrained, so is self T − 2. I.e., if one self would like to
consume 24 hours of leisure, the preceding self would prefer to consume more, but is by
deﬁnition capacity constrained at 24 hours. Therefore, either theinterior solution will hold,
or the self will be capacity constrained. (See Proposition 1 in the Appendix.)
16Theresult thatthenext period’sstock is alinear of thisperiod’sstock holdsas longas utilityfromleisure
and the reward have the same, constant relative risk-aversion coefﬁcient (see previous footnote).
10Self T −3 maximizes discounted utility knowing the marginal propensities to consume
leisure of his successors, and the process continues through backwards induction. Let H
t
denotet’smarginal propensitytoconsume leisureout ofthestockof timeheinherits,which
is constant in this case. On the equilibrium path, the change in leisure consumption due to






T−i+1 +  − (1 − )H
T−i+1
; (6)
for i =1 ;:::;T, beginning at the end with H










for t =0 ;:::;T − 1.
For a ﬁxed reward,  =0and H
T−1 =1 . Taking into account the capacity constraint,
the stock of potential leisure time remaining in any period t +1is then SH
t+1 =m a x [ ( 1−
 H
t ) S H
t ;S H
t −24].
The general problem can be written as a modiﬁed Bellman equation. To understand this
problem better, consider selves as occupying a day in the week. Monday’s and Tuesday’s
selves agreeon therelativevaluation of utility ﬂowsreceived on Wednesday and all follow-
ing days: those discount factors decline by  each day. However, Monday thinks Tuesday
overvalues his own utility. Therefore, Monday views his subsequent stream of utility as 
times Tuesday’s total discounted utility, minus a bit of Tuesday’s leisure utility.
Thus, for any self t, today’s discounted utility equals utility of current leisure, plus
tomorrow’sself’stotal utilitydiscountedby long-runfactor,minusthediscounted amount
17See Proposition2 in the Appendix for the full derivation.
11by which the next self overvalues his current leisure consumption:
UH(St;T−t)= m a x
l t2 [0;24]
fu(lt)+[ U H( S t +1;T−t−1) − (1 − )u(lt+1)]g; (8)
where St+1 = St − lt and leisure in t +1is implicitly a function of the inherited stock:
lt+1(St+1;T−t−1).
Self t maximizes with respect to his leisure and thereby the stock that he leaves for the









By the Envelope Theorem, we see the change in discounted utility when any self t +1










From the ﬁrst-order condition of self t +1 , we can rewrite this equation as
U
0
H(St+1;T−t−1) = u0(lt+1): (11)




0( l t +1)
"





Note from Equation (12) that if  =1 , standard exponential discounting applies.
Since the marginal propensity to consume leisure from the inherited stock of time is
positive, for <1marginal utility grows faster than the long-run discount rate. In other
18For another explicit derivation, see Laibson (1995).
12words, the short-term discount factor raises the effective discount rate (lowers the effective
discount factor) in every period, although to different extents.
Let RH
t+1 = (1 − (1 − )H
t+1(St+1;T −t−1)) denote the effective discount factor
between t and t +1 ,w h e r e H
t( S t ;T −t)=@lt=@St,s e l ft ’s marginal propensity to
consume leisure out of the stock of time he inherits. Note that the effective discount factor
falls as H rises, as the impact on the next self’s leisure consumption of leaving a bit more
stock grows stronger. Therefore, if H increases as the ending date approaches, the rate of
change in marginal utility (and thereby leisure) increases as well.
Using a utility function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) results in  being
simply a function of time to the deadline (and the parameters of discount factors, reward
and risk-aversion coefﬁcients), independent of the current stock of potential leisure time.
Thus, auniqueequilibriumpathwill exist. Theexampleof logutilityrepresentsaparticular
case of this type, and the corresponding equilibrium path was presented in Equation (6).












































To illustratethe results, consider an example with a long-run discount factor of one (the
effective daily factor corresponding to traditional annual rates of discount) and  =2 = 3
(today has a 50% premium over any other day). Utility from work is a log function, and
the subject has 10 weeks to complete a task that requires an average of 4 hours of work a
day. Figure 1 compares the equilibrium work path to the desired path of self 0 for a ﬁxed
13reward.Essentially, the current self would like to do little or no work today, but after today
he would like himself to work at a steady pace. However, knowing that his successors
would squander extra leisure time, he ends up procrastinating more, forcing future selves
to work more.












































Figure 2 compares the equilibrium work path to the desired path of self 0 when a hy-
perbolic discounter faces a variable reward.19 Hyperbolic discounting with rational expec-
tations causes less work to be performed overall than the initial self would desire. Further-
more, it induces procrastination in the form of a rising, rather than level, workload.
The procrastinationinduced by these dynamically inconsistent preferences, though “ra-
tional,” is no longer welfare maximizing as it was with exponential discounting. Proposi-
tion 3 in the Appendix proves that, with a variable reward, the rational-expectations equi-
librium can be pareto dominated for all selves if they all collectively worked a bit more.20
19The reward takes the form of ln[ST] where  is set such that the rational self just completes the work
requirement.
20Laibson (1995) demonstrates how hyperbolic discounting can generate undersaving and lower welfare
for all selves. While in his inﬁnite-horizon model the result is a lower steady-state level of consumption, in
this ﬁnite model, the problemis that the ultimate reward is too small, due to too littlework.
145 Differential Discounting
Self-control problems occur when different events are discounted at different rates. The
story of the salient present said that events may bediscounted at differentrates according to
their timing. The second salience story says that the effects of certain actions may be more
salient than those of other activities. In other words, events with different characteristics
may be discounted at different rates.
Examiningseveral anomaliesindiscountingpreferences,Loewenstein and Prelec(1992)
noted that not only do discount rates appear to change over a time horizon, but they also
seem to vary with different types of rewards or costs. Lowenstein (1987) asserted that dis-
count rates may not be independent of the types of goods consumed; rather, they may vary
with goods of differing characteristics. Luckert and Adamowicz (1993) found empirical
evidence of different time preferences for environmental versus ﬁnancial goods.
Akerlof’s salience costs operated like different discount rates for leisure and rewards:
today’s costs of performing the task were moresalient than tomorrow’sbut today’s beneﬁts
were not. I will refer to this different treatment over time of costs and beneﬁts (in this
case foregone utility from leisure and the rewards for work, respectively) as “differential
discounting.”
With salient costs, the present value of postponing a one-time task declines faster than
does the ﬂow of beneﬁts. From any point in time, there will be another point in the future
wherethemarginalgainfrompostponementequalsthemarginalbeneﬁtsforegone,butonce
arrived there, postponing is again optimal. Thus, differential discounting, like hyperbolic
discounting, creates dynamically inconsistent preferences.
Furthermore,differentialdiscountingcan createpreferencesthatseem hyperbolic. Con-
sider again the hypothetical tradeoffs of certiﬁed checks; now suppose people get utility
from receiving a prize, in addition to liking more money. If people discount the joy of
winning more heavily than cash, they may prefer taking $100 now over $200 in 2 years.
However, looking ahead 6 years, the thrill of victory is so heavily discounted that relatively
15more of the overall prize value is in the cash, so rather than $100 in 6 years they choose
$200 in 2 more years.21
Suppose that people do not discount leisure (or disutility from researching a paper) in
the same way they discount the reward or penalty; speciﬁcally, let us assume that utility
from leisure is more heavily discounted than the reward for work. Beneﬁts obtained in t
periods are valued at t, while the utility of leisure in t periods is valued at (γ)t,w h e r e
γ<1 .
In deciding how much work to do and when to do it, the self at time t would desire the
current and future work path that maximizes total discounted utility:
UD
t (lt;l t+1;:::;lT−1)=u ( l t)+
T− t − 1 X
i =1
(γ)iu(lt+i)+ T− tF( S T) ; (13)
where u(lt) is again utility of leisure at time t, F() the reward function, and St the total
stock of available time not yet used in leisure inherited by self t, as presented in Section 3.
Onthedesiredpathofself t,theﬁrst-orderconditionswithrespect toworkinanyperiod
imply that marginal utility should rise according to the discount factor for costs; however,
they depend on the initial perspective:
u0(lt+i)=γ − i T− t − iF0( S T) ; (14)
where ST equals the cumulative amount of work completed by the deadline.
Thus, preferences change over time. Self t wants marginal utility at T − 1 to be
γt−T+1F0(ST), while the self at T −1 equates marginal utilityto thelower F0(ST)(hold-
ing total work constant). In other words, self t wants later selves to work harder than they
will.
However, if selves have rational expectations, they will choose their current workload
21Although this story requires believing people derive intrinsic utility from receiving cash, so does the
hyperbolicstory: ahyperbolicdiscountermaximizing a stream of consumptionshouldstillwant tomaximize
his present value (in market terms) of income.
16knowing how subsequent selves will react. Consider the problem for the last self (T − 1)




The resulting lT−1 is a linear function of ST−1 up to the capacity constraint:22







T−1 denote T − 1’s (constant) marginal propensity to consume leisure out of the
stock of time she inherits, in this case 1=(1 + ).S e l fT− 2maximizes current utility
from leisure plus the discounted utility from T − 1’s leisure plus the discounted reward,
deciding howmuch of the current stock of time not spent in leisure to leave T −1, knowing




The unconstrained lT−2 is also a linear function of inherited stock:







As in the hyperbolic case, if self T − 1 is capacity constrained, so is self T − 2.S e l f
T− 3maximizes discounted utility knowing the marginal propensities to consume leisure
of her successors, and the process continues through backwards induction. Let D
t denote
the differential discounter’s (constant) marginal propensity to consume leisure out of the
stock inherited at time t. Proposition 4 in the Appendix derives explicitly the recursive
22Again, the result that the next period’s stock is a linear function of this period’s stock holds as long as









T−i+1 + γ +( 1−γ)  iD
T−i+1
; (19)
for i =1 ;:::;T and starting at the end with D








for t =0 ;:::;T − 1.
The general problem of the rational differential discounter can be rewritten as a mod-
iﬁed Bellman equation. Consider each self as a day in the week. Monday and Tuesday
agree on the relative valuation of leisure utility received on all the days, discounting by an
additional γ each day. However, Monday thinks Tuesday undervalues the reward received
at the end. (Recall Equation (14).) Therefore, Monday views her subsequent stream of
utility as γ times Tuesday’s total discounted utility, plus an extra bit of the reward utility.
Thus, self t maximizes her current utility of leisure plus her successor’s utility stream,
discounted by factor γ, plus a term to make up for her successor’s relative undervaluation
of the delayed reward:
UD(St;T−t)= m a x
l t2 [0;24]
n
u(lt)+γUD(St+1;T−t−1) + (1 − γ)T−tF(ST)
o
: (21)
Under both types of discounting, self t knows that self t +1will overvalue her own
consumption of leisure relative to the total stream of utility, in the hyperbolic case because
she overvalues current leisure relative to tomorrow and in the differential case because she
overvalues it relative to the marginal discounted reward, from t’s perspective.
The differential discounting self maximizes total utility with respect to the stock of
potential leisure time she leaves her successor, taking into account how much of that stock
18gets passed through to the deadline. The following ﬁrst-order condition results for lt 2
(0;24):
u0(lt) − γU0




By the Envelope Theorem, we see the change in discounted utility when any self t +1


























Logically, 0  @ST=@St+1  1: at least part of another hour not spent in leisure left
for tomorrow will be added to the cumulative stock of work at the end; some will likely be
taken by successors as more leisure, but not more than the initial additional amount. For
γ<1 , marginal utility will grow more slowly than under exponential discounting with
factor γ but faster than with . With a ﬁxed reward and work requirement, @ST=@St+1 =
0, and time allocation proceeds as with high exponential discounting.
Let D
t (St;T−t)denote the differential discounter’s marginal propensity to consume
leisure out of the stock inherited at time t. As in the hyperbolic case, using a CRRA utility
function makes  a functionof time to the deadline and independent of the current stock of
potential leisure time, resulting in a unique equilibrium path. The marginal change in the
ﬁnal stock of time not spent in leisure (cumulative work) is what remains after each self
19consumes its portion of leisure: St+1 = St(1−D









on the marginal reward cancel. Speciﬁcally, F 0(ST)@ST=@St+1 = =St+1. Equation (19)
presented the corresponding equilibrium path of D.
If a differential discounter faces a ﬁxed reward, her preferences will be time-consistent:
although each self evaluates thereward differently,the behavior of any one self does not af-
fect the marginal reward, conditional on all selves wanting to satisfy the work requirement.
Therefore, she behaves like an exponential discounter with a high rate of time preference
(corresponding to the discount factor γ).









































With a variable reward, however, the marginal reward is affected and evaluated differ-
ently by each self. Figure 3 compares the equilibrium work path to the desired path of
self 0 with a variable reward.23 With rational expectations, differential discounting causes
the start of work to be postponed until nearer the deadline and, with a concave reward (or
convex penalty) function, less work to be performed overall than desired.
However, the differential discounter actually does not procrastinate as much as she
would like. Her marginal utility rises more slowly than on the desired path, and she does
notbuildupher workloadasrapidlyassheprefers. Essentially, shesees thecost ofworkde-
23The reward in the illustration takes the form of ln[ST] where  is set such that the rational self just
completes the work requirement. As before,  =1and γ = :97.
20clining much faster over time than the beneﬁts and therefore would like to postpone work;
however, knowing her successors will value their leisure time more relative to the reward
and not work enough, she compensates by doing more work early (actually procrastinating
less).24 Still, less work is performed overall than she would like.
























Figure4 shows this result from another angle. A Lorenz curve compares thepercentage
of work completed to the percentage of time elapsed. For the same work requirement
(with  adjusted accordingly), the path of the rational differential discounter lies inside
the desired path of work accumulation, closer to the constant-work path of the 45-degree
line. This result implies that the differential discounter ends up procrastinating less than
the initial self would like to behave, given a work requirement.
Thus, the self-control problem actually has two facets:
1. the total amount of work performed, and
2. the steepness of the path of work.
While both hyperbolic and differential discounters perform too little work in equilib-
rium, they have different perspectives on the path of work and the amount of procrastina-
tion. If the desired paths were to be followed, and the reward parameter lowered to achieve
the same work requirement (shifting down the desired path of marginal utility), the “ideal”
24For example, a student would like to write an “A” paper the last week of the semester. However, if she
actually waited until then to start, at that pointshe would settle for a passing grade.
21(from the point of view of self 0) hyperbolic work path would be less steep than the actual
one, whiletheideal differentialworkpath wouldbesteeper. Thus, theinitialhyperbolicself
thinks his successors will procrastinate too much, while the differential discounter seems
to think they don’t procrastinate enough.
This result has important implications for welfare and the setting of deadlines. Pro-
crastination can be reduced by dividing the task into segments, each with its own deadline,
forcing the student to accomplish more work earlier than she would normally.25 While
this technique could help hyperbolic selves improve welfare by ﬂattening the work path, it
would certainly lower welfare for differential discounters (holding total work constant).
6 Comparing Regimes and Rewards
For employers desiring to get work out of their employees, methods of inducement are
important. This section considers the relative effectiveness of delayed ﬁxed and variable
rewards (such as bonuses) and contemporaneous rewards (such as wages) on exponential,
hyperbolic, and differential discounters.
6.1 Fixed Rewards
For the worker to achieve a ﬁxed work requirement, a sufﬁcient ﬁxed delayed reward or
penalty must exist. The amount of the minimum required reward,of course, will depend on
the discounting regime. The differential discounter behaves like an exponential discounter
with a high rate of time preference (γ), but she requires a lesser reward to induce work
since it is discounted at a lower rate. She also requires less inducement than an exponential
discounter using , since the higher rate of time preference for leisure reduces the present
values of the alternative paths of utility and also their difference.26
25Psychological studies of college students have documented the effectiveness of closer supervision and
more frequent deadlines in reducing procrastination: Lamwers and Jazwinski (1989), Reiser (1984), and
Wesp (1986).
26See Proposition5 in the Appendix for proof.
22Hyperbolicdiscounters, on the other hand, may requiremore inducement than an expo-
nential discounter using . First of all, the ﬁxed rewardis evaluatedusing a higher effective
discount rate: T < T; second of all, since subsequent selves will not behave ideally, the
utility differential may be greater. However, that utility differential is also evaluated at a
higher effective discount rate, so the net effect is ambiguous.













































Figure 5 compares the optimal work paths of hyperbolic and differential discounters
for identical work requirements when rewards are ﬁxed. The parameters are calibrated to
generate similar, stylized amounts of procrastination, although other characteristics will
differ.27 The constant work path thus represents an exponential discounter at traditional
rates(which areeffectively zero on a daily basis). The differentialdiscounter procrastinates
like a high exponential discounter. The hyperbolic discounter, on the other hand, has lower
but increasing effective discount rates, leading to a work path which builds slowly initially
and accelerates toward the deadline.
6.2 Variable Delayed Rewards
Incentives change, however, if the reward varies with the amount of work completed. At
any point in time, the hyperbolicdiscounter evaluates a given marginal reward with a lower
27Speciﬁcally,  =1 ,=2 = 3 ,a n dγ=: 97.
23discount factor than the differential discounter (s versus s at any point s periods from
the deadline). Given the same reward schedule, the hyperbolic discounter performs less
work than the differential discounter (who performs less work than her exponential coun-
terpart with the long-run discount factor). Correspondingly, for a given amount of work,
a hyperbolic discounter would require a greater reward parameter than a differential dis-
counter.










































Figure 6 shows the optimal paths for workers with (“low”=), constant ( =1 ), hyper-
bolic, and differential discount functions when the variable reward parameter () for each
type is set to achieve the same work requirement.28 The differential discounter procrasti-
nates the most, starting last and building up quickly. The hyperbolic discounter requires
the highest reward parameter to cope with the self-control problem as well as the heavier
discounting of the reward by all selves, compared to the other discounters. Meanwhile the
exponential discounter (here a non-discounter) requires the lowest marginal reward, since
she has no self-control problem to overcome.
Although not readily apparent from the ﬁgure, the paths of the daily effective discount
rate also differ according to discounting regime: With hyperbolicdiscounting, the effective
28In this log utilities case with  =2 = 3 ,=1 ,γ=: 97 and a work target of 284 hours, the hyperbolic
discounterrequires a marginal reward about50% higherthan thatof the differentialdiscounterand more than
twice as high as the low exponential discounter.
24discount rate rises over time; with exponential discounting it is constant; and with differ-
ential discounting, it declines as the deadline approaches.29 Thus, the time path of the
effective discount rate presents a distinguishing characteristic for each regime which may
be directly observable.
6.3 Contemporaneous Rewards
On the other hand, the employer may not be restricted to delayed compensation; another
option is to offer a pay-as-you-go reward. Consider a contemporaneous reward that is a
linear function of that period’s work, like a wage; the worker’s net utility in the current
period is then u(l)+y(24− l). The wage acts like a constant variable cost of extraction in
the natural resource analog: extracting another unit of the resource, leisure time, costs the
worker y in foregone wages.
First suppose only a wage is offered. Without a delayed reward depending on cumula-
tive work or task completion, behavior today has no impact on behavior tomorrow. Thus,
regardless of type of discounting, each self worksuntil the marginal utility of leisure equals
the wage, and no procrastination occurs.
However, if the differential discounter could control successive selves, she could be
made better off. Since future utility from leisure is discounted more heavily than future
wages, she wouldprefer futureselves to workuntil marginal utilityof leisure is higher than
t h ew a g e( s e l ftwould want u(lt+i)=γ − i y ). Essentially, the wages earned in the future
cost less in present value terms of utility from leisure, so the differential discounter would
rather do less work now and earn more later. If the preferences of the initial self were
realized, procrastination would occur (i.e., the workload would build up over time) and for
the same work requirement the necessary wage would be much smaller. Figure 7 compares
29Propositions6 and 7 in the Appendixshow these results for thelog utilityexample. However, there may
be some combinations of  and the risk-aversion coefﬁcient for which the effective discount rates decline
near the deadlinefor both hyperbolicand differentialdiscounters;still,theimplied paths look quitedifferent.
In fact, for inelastic elasticities of intertemporal substitution,the effective discount factor for the differential
discounter can follow a U-shaped path, while that of the hyperbolic discounter remains monotonic.












































the actual constant path to what would occur if the desired path were followed and wages
were adjusted accordingly.
Combining wages with delayed rewards ﬂattens work paths for all types of discoun-
ters.30 Thus, offering wages reduces procrastination. (Combination paths are not shown
since adding wages makes the marginal propensity to take leisure a function of the inher-
ited stock of time, rather than an independent and unique function of time and the reward
and discounting parameters).
6.4 Choosing Rewards
For a supervisor or employer, the optimal reward schedule will likely be a mixture of the
options. He will have to trade off the relative effectiveness of each type of compensation in
attaininga certain workgoal, his need to reduceprocrastinationin the faceof uncertainty,31
and his desire possibly to encourage procrastination if he faces positive interest rates. The
present value of his wage payments will be lower if more of the work is performed later.
The tradeoffsfor differentrewardsalso depend on the worker’spreference for time dis-
counting. A ﬁxed reward will be cheapest for the employer of the differential discounter,
30In the resource extraction analog, since net marginal surplus must rise by the discount rate, higher con-
stant marginal extraction costs cause marginal utilityto rise more slowly.
31Fischer (1999) shows that with a ﬁxed penalty and uncertainty about the true size of the work require-
ment, high procrastinators are more likely to fail to meet a deadline.
26but it will induce the most procrastination. Delayed variable rewards are more costly for
hyperbolic discounters than for differential or (low-rate) exponential ones. Contempora-
neous wages reduce procrastination for all types, relative to either delayed reward. Given
only wages, no one will procrastinate, but differential discounters would be willing to take
lower wages if they could get future selves to work more. Variable rewards do not offer
ﬂexibility if the ultimate work requirement is uncertain (unless the reward schedules can
be changed); ﬁxed rewards allow for changes in the work requirement, if they are high
enough to prevent abandonment in enough cases. Multiple deadlines are effective in re-
ducing procrastination and allow more delay of payment than wages, but they tend to be
more costly to administrate. Furthermore, differential discounters would require a much
higher ﬁxed reward compared to a single deadline; hyperbolic discounters, on the other
hand, could conceivably require less, if the earlier deadlines help them cope with their
self-control problem.
An additional problem occurs if an employer faces a distribution of workers with dif-
ferent tastes: selection. What type of workers will he attract with a given compensation
package?
6.5 Experimental and Empirical Extensions
While the existence of changes in temporary preferences has been substantiated in several
cases, their inﬂuence on more general economic behavior still has not been well docu-
mented, theoretically or empirically. Much of the evidence for temporary preference the-
ory revolves around experiments involving one-time rewards or punishments, rather than
repeated choices which impact future choice sets and reward ﬂows.32
Laibson shows that over the long horizon, hyperbolic discounting mimics a constant
discount rate, higher than the long-run rate (the same logic should hold for differential
discounting). Since the rate is effectively constant, distinguishing between the exponen-
32See Loewenstein and Prelec or Ainslie for good overviews.
27tial and time-inconsistent regimes empirically is difﬁcult. In the ﬁnite horizon, however,
the effective discount rate changes over time. For example, in the log utilities case, the
effective discount rate rises over time with hyperbolic discounting; with a cumulative ex-
traction constraint (as in the ﬁxed-reward case), it rises quite sharply as the resource nears
exhaustion. The effective discount rate of the differential discounter, on the other hand,
declines as the deadline approaches (and is constant for a ﬁxed reward).33 The model of
procrastination as a ﬁnite-horizon resource extraction problem may provide an opportunity
to test explicitly fortime-inconsistent discounting. Varying rewardschemes could also help
distinguish between hyperbolic and differential discounting.
7 Conclusion
To date, much of the procrastination literature has approached it as being generated by
dynamically inconsistent, and thereby irrational, choices. Yet psychological studies reveal
an awareness of a self-control problem, suggesting that people are rational about their fu-
ture behavior but have difﬁculty inﬂuencing it to conform to current preferences. For a
divisibletask, imperfect foresight is not necessary to generate procrastination; in fact, mere
impatience can explain many aspects of the behavior. However, the time-consistent model
cannot account for the inherent self-control problem. Both types of time-inconsistent pref-
erences motivated by salience stories can explain these puzzles, as well as the seemingly
high rates of timepreferenceimplicit in procrastinating behavior. When compared to expo-
nential discounting with a low, long-run rate, discount factors motivated by salience costs
produce more procrastination, whether it is today that is more salient than tomorrowor the
disutility of work that is more salient than the reward. Furthermore, the time path of work,
though “rational,” is not welfare maximizing in either case.
Both hyperbolic and differential discounters wish they would do more work in the fu-
33See Footnote 23.
28ture, but the actual self-control problems are quite different. While the differential dis-
counter wishes she could get herself to do lot more work near the deadline, the hyperbolic
discounter wishes that, after today, he would work at a fairly steady pace. Thus, in the ac-
tual equilibrium,the hyperbolicdiscounter procrastinates “too much” while the differential
discounter does not procrastinate “enough” (build up work fast enough).
The different reactions to different reward types, as well as the different time paths
of effective discount rates, may allow an observer to distinguish which type of salience
induces common forms of procrastination. Making such a distinction is important, since
the prescription for inﬂuencing behavior depends on what aspect is salient. Hyperbolic
discounters can be made better off if compelled to reduce procrastination; differential dis-
counters, on the other hand, would have to be compensated to perform more work earlier
rather than later.
The results here are important for models of short-term labor-supply decisions when
compensation packages include delayed rewards, (such as bonuses at the completion of a
project) or penalties (such as being ﬁred if the deadline is not met). Although designed for
procrastination, the model can also represent the consumption of an exhaustible good over
a ﬁxed period.A natural application would involve the path of lifetime savings behavior in
the presence of a bequest motive (or charitable contributions and the Great Reward), when
the evaluation of the utility of the bequest changes over time.34 In conclusion, if salience
matters, making preferencesdynamically inconsistent, theimplicationsfor many economic
models are profound.
34With a positive interest rate for savings, this would in a sense be a renewable resource problem.
29Appendix
Proposition 1 If self t is capacity constrained, so is self t − 1.
This result holds for any concave utility and reward functions. Start by considering the












where ST−1 = ST−2 − lT−2.
For an interior solution to hold, then
u0(lT−2)=2F0(ST−1 −24): (28)
But from (26) we know that the right-hand side is less than u0(24). Thus, (5) cannot hold
with equality since u0(lT−2)  u0(24) by deﬁnition of the capacity constraint. Therefore, if
self T − 1 is capacity constrained, then T − 2 must be as well.
This result holds for any capacity-constrained self and his predecessors. Suppose self
t ﬁnds that, given the impact he has on subsequent utilities, he would prefer to take more
than 24 hours of leisure but cannot. His predecessor has no impact on the behavior of t and
the same impact on his successors, but discounted more heavily, implying he would prefer
to take even more leisure than t would. Therefore, self t − 1 (and by the same logic, all
preceding selves) must be capacity constrained at 24 hours of leisure as well. The same
logic holds for the differential discounter (as long as γ  1).
Furthermore, the interior solution rule for leisure consumption will always exceed the
30capacity constraint when the successor is capacity constrained. If the next self is capacity
constrained, the marginal impact of the current self passing on more stock is greater, since
the next self cannot raise his consumption. If the capacity constraint were lifted for sub-
sequent selves (the interior solution rule held), the marginal impact of leaving more stock
would be even less, implying the current self would want to consume even more leisure
now if he could.
Proposition 2 The hyperbolic discounter’s marginal propensity to consume leisure at t is






T−i+1 +  − (1 − )H
T−i+1
;
for i =1 ;:::;T.
Using the log utility example, we can rewrite Equation (12), the equilibrium relation-





(1 − (1 − )@lt+1=@St+1)
lt+1
: (29)
As seen earlier, with log (or other CRRA) utility functions, any self’s leisure consump-
tion is a linear function of the inherited stock. Thus, in (29) we can substitute tSt for lt











Note that St cancels out; the marginal propensity to consume leisure is independent of
the inherited stock.
Solving for t, we get Equation (6), the backwards recursion giving the change in
leisure consumption due to the change in inherited stock on the equilibrium path.
31Proposition 3 The rational-expectations equilibrium of a hyperbolic discounter can be
pareto-dominated for all selves.
Consider what would happen to the welfare of any self t if he and all his successors
reduced their number of leisure hours along the equilibrium path by :
UH(St;T−t)=u ( l t− )+







(lt+i − )): (31)
Recall that along the equilibrium path, the effective discount factors are less than ,
which implies that u0(lt+i)i <u 0 ( l T − 1 )  T − 1 − t=T−tF0(),f o r0i<T−t−1 .
Using this fact, differentiating (31) with respect to  and evaluating at  =0 , we see that
welfare would rise for each self if all selves worked a little bit more:
@UH(St;T−t)
@
j=0 = −u0(lt) −
T−t−1 X
i=1
iu0(lt+i)+( T−t ) T−tF0(ST)
− T−tF0(ST)−(T −t−1)2T−tF 0(ST)
+(T − t)T−tF0(ST)
=( T − t − 1)(1 − )T−tF0(ST) 0: (32)
Self T −1 is just indifferentto working a bit more, since that is his ﬁrst-ordercondition;
all preceding selves would be strictly better off. Intuitively, since each self’s successors
don’t behave “properly,” the gains from the bigger reward at the deadline due to the cumu-
lative additional work effort outweigh the discounted stream of lost utility from leisure. If
all selves worked a bit more (including earlier ones), even T − 1 would be strictly better
off since his reward would be much larger.
The same exercise can be performed for the differential discounter.
Proposition 4 The differential discounter’s marginal propensity to consume leisure at t is







T−i+1 + γ +( 1−γ)  iD
T−i+1
;
for i =1 ;:::;T.
Using the log utility example, we can rewrite Equation (25), the equilibrium relation-













As in the hyperboliccase, we can substitute tSt forlt and t+1St+1 (ort+1(1−t)St)
for lt+1. The following identities also hold:
St+1 = St(1 − D
t ); (34)





































Again, St cancels out; the marginal propensity to consume leisure is independent of the
inherited stock.
Solving for D
t , we get Equation (19), the backwards recursion giving the change in
leisure consumption due to the change in inherited stock on the equilibrium path.
33Proposition 5 The differential discounter requires less of a ﬁxed reward than an exponen-
tial discounter.
Given any work requirement and corresponding path of leisure, to induce work, the
discounted value of the reward must be greater than or equal to the difference between
discounted utility of the no-leisure path and that of the path with work for every self. The
reward will equal the greatest difference:











Differentiating the contents of the brackets with respect to γ, and recognizing that
discounted marginal utility remains constant and that the total amount of leisure cannot
change, one can see the remaining discounted difference between utility is increasing with
γ for all t; thus, dF=dγ > 0. In other words, the more heavily leisure is discounted, the
less high the reward must be to induce work. The same method can be used to see that
dF=d < 0. Thus, the differential discounter requires less of an inducement than either the
low- or high-rate exponential discounter.
Proposition 6 For log utilities, the hyperbolic discounter’s marginal propensity to con-
sume leisure (MPC) — and thereby the effective discount rate — increases as the deadline
approaches for any <1 = (1 − ).
Equation (7) presents H
t . The MPC rises over time if H
t > H
t − 1,o ri f
1−










This expression can be reduced to

T−t(1 − (1 − )) > 0; (41)
34which holds for any <1 = (1 − ).
Proposition 7 For log utilities, the differential discounter’s effective discount factor in-
creases as the deadline approaches.
Let RD











t+1 >  D
t. Using the expression for D from Equation (20), we can



















T−t−1 > 0; (44)
which always holds.
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